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THE CULTURE OF REGULATION
Rodney A. Smolla*
INTRODUCTION
The book Rationales and Rationalizations' docu-
ments well the "culture of regulation" that per-
vades much of the discussion of law and public
policy governing electronic media. Several philo-
sophical and public policy impulses, doctrinal de-
vices, and political realities have coalesced to. pro-
duce this culture. This commentary applauds
Rationales and Rationalizations for its critique of the
current impulse to over-regulate electronic media
and then focuses on one recent episode - the pro-
mulgation of new affirmative standards for chil-
dren's educational television - as a "case study" in
the threat to the First Amendment posed by this
regulatory culture.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLICY
ENGINES THAT DRIVE THE CULTURE
OF REGULATION
There are a number of philosophical and policy
arguments that have recently gained popular cur-
rency that combine to form the engines that drive
the culture of regulation. These include: (1) the
metaphor of the "social compact;" (2) the ideal of
broadcasters as "public trustees;" (3) the concep-
tualization of broadcasters as engaged in a 'joint
venture" with government; (4) the faith that the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") exists to elevate public discourse;
(5) the proposition that the airwaves should be
used to educate children; and (6) the philosophy
that as forms of electronic media converge, so do
* Professor of Law and former Director of the Institute of
Bill of Rights Law at the Marshall-Whythe School of Law,
College of William and Mary
1 Robert Corn-Revere, RATIONALES AND RATIONALIZA-
TIONS (forthcoming 1997).
2 Chairman Reed Hundt, Reinventing the Social Compact,
Address to the BROADCASTING & CABLE Interface Conference
(September 24, 1996) (transcript available on-line. (visited
the theories under which government may claim
the right to regulate them.
Reed Hundt, Chairman of the FCC, has grown
fond of invoking the notion of "social compact" in
discussing the obligations of broadcasters. 2 The
Chairman is doing more than playing a clever
rhetorical device here; he is invoking an entire be-
lief structure. Western philosophy's original so-
cial compact thinkers, natural law philosophers
like John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, posited that
the original condition of human beings is the
state of nature, a place where there is no law and
no security for life, liberty or property.3 The state
of nature is an ugly and violent place, a jungle of
murder and mayhem, where life is "solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short."4 To escape this natural
state of terror human beings come together and
form the social compact in which individuals sur-
render their absolute freedom for the rule of law,
creating a sovereign that will keep order and se-
cure the blessings of liberty.
Particularly in the philosophy of Thomas Hob-
bes there is an inexorable quality to the social com-
pact, an automaticity, an inevitability. We begin in
the state of nature and we move to the social com-
pact, swept by the natural currents of the universe.
The social compact will always come about be-
cause as rational beings humans we will inexora-
bly chose security, law and order over chaos and
fear.
The invocation of the phrase "social compact"
in the context of the regulation of electronic me-
dia is, of course, not so grandiose or profound as
Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/
spreh637.txt>).
3 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, at
§§ 4-11 (C.B. Macpherson, ed., Hacket, 1980) (1690);
THOMAs HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100-02 (Michael Oakeshott ed.,
MacMillan Publ'g Co., 1962) (1651).
4 HOBBES, supra note 3, at 100.
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the compact that forms the origins of govern-
ment, but it partakes of the same essential analytic
elements. The case for the regulation of broad-
casting begins with a "state of nature" argument.
The natural laws of physics produce scarcity in the
electro-magnetic spectrum. Without governmen-
tal rules to assign frequencies and licenses on the
spectrum, it is reduced to the chaos of a war of all
against all.5 The Federal Communications Com-
mission may be seen to exist by necessity, as part of
the natural order, as inevitable as governmental
itself if human beings are to behave rationally.
Once the electro-magnetic spectrum was discov-
ered and invention made it exploitable, the need
for the imposition of the rule of law was self-evi-
dent.
If the basic need for a social compact governing
use of the electro-magnetic spectrum was self-evi-
dent, however, the terms of that compact were not.
A stark, minimalist compact would require little
more than the assignment of frequencies. How-
ever the frequencies were assigned, whether by
auction or governmental grant, and whether they
would exist in perpetuity or for limited terms,
such a minimalist contract would require very lit-
tle ongoing supervision by government. The only
significant governmental task would be to police
encroachment by users into parts of the spectrum
not assigned to them. A Federal Communications
Commission would not be necessary to do this
job; it could be assigned to a cadre of "frequency
police," perhaps located in a special division of
the FBI.
Our history, however, has been otherwise. We
have embarked on a more elaborate social com-
pact, one in which valuable frequencies are given
away by the government licensees, who in return
sign on to a regime of laws that impose a number
of restrictions on the content of speech that may
be broadcast, as well as several broad and gauzy
affirmative obligations. Broadcasters are per-
ceived as "public trustees," with affirmative re-
sponsibilities to broadcast in the "public interest."
5 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76
(1969).
6 CORN-REVERE, supra note 1.
7 In FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), the
Supreme Court decided a case arising from the broadcast of
a satiric 12-minute comedy monologue by George Carlin, en-
titled "Filthy Words." Carlin made fun of the "words you
can't say on the airwaves" by discussing them in endless
comic permutations. The FCC ruled that Carlin's routine
was indecent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, which forbids
In its most extreme manifestations, this notion
of the broadcaster as public trustee seems to con-
template that government and broadcasters are
participants in an ambitious joint venture, a ven-
ture aimed at elevating public discourse, educating
children and enlightening political debate. The
FCC exists not merely to rescue us from the physi-
cal chaos of an unregulated spectrum; it exists to
secure a more profound redemption. The FCC
will regulate the marketplace of ideas in order to
save it. One at times gets the sense that deep in
the soul of the contemporary FCC there resides a
hope that springs eternal: that someday all televi-
sion would look like PBS.
There is a ratchet mechanism at work in the
culture of regulation. Each regulatory step pro-
vides momentum for the next one. Out of the
need for physical space regulation sprang a
claimed right to regulate content. Out of the
need to regulate the broadcast spectrum sprang a
claimed right to regulate other forms of elec-
tronic communication, such as computer commu-
nication over the Internet. As forms of media
converge so do regulatory theories. If we have an
FCC for radio and television, why not for commu-
nication on-line?
THE DOCTRINAL DEVICES USED TO
JUSTIFY THE CULTURE OF REGULATION
The philosophical and policy impulses that
nourish the culture of regulation require legal
doctrines to justify them. The doctrines that have
been prominent in recent debates include: (1)
the claim that many forms of current "regulation"
are nothing but "voluntarism" by players in the
private sector, such as broadcasters agreeing to air
a specified number of educational children's pro-
grams;6 (2) the argument that the doctrines ema-
nating from FCC v. Pacifica7 apply to media other
than broadcasting;" (3) the argument that the
doctrines emanating from FCC v. Pacifica apply to
areas of speech other than "indecency;" (4) the
the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communications." A divided Supreme Court
affirmed the Commission. A majority of the Court agreed
that the First Amendment rules governing the content regu-
lation of broadcasting were less stringent than those gov-
erning print media. The Court was divided, however, on the
rationale for this holding, as well as the contours of the type
of "indecent speech" that could be kept off the airwaves.
8 In 1987, the FCC first suggested that broadcasters
should no longer assume that it was safe to broadcast inde-
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claim that special First Amendment rules apply
anytime government acts for the well-being of
children; (5) the assertion that rules aimed at re-
quiring warnings, labels, ratings, and disclosures
all enhance First Amendment values by placing
adding to the information available in the market-
place of ideas; (6) the claim that many forms of
regulation merely "empower" consumers, particu-
larly parents, to make intelligent choices in the
marketplace; and (7) the assertion that specific
governmental regulatory standards promote First
Amendment values by employing precision in regu-
lation, a positive value that reduces the chilling ef-
fect on speech by reducing uncertainty.
The Supreme Court provided some doctrinal
momentum to the culture of regulation in its
hopelessly inscrutable decision last term in Denver
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc., v. FCC.9 In Denver Area the Supreme Court
struck down two sections and upheld one section
of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992. 1o The decision was
highly splintered, with Justice Breyer announcing
the judgment of the Court. Some parts of his
opinion carried a majority of Justices, others a
plurality, and a total of six Justices issued opin-
ions. By a vote of 5-4, the Court held that the pro-
visions of the law which permit cable operators to
refuse to air indecent programming (defined as
"sexually explicit" or "patently offensive" mate-
rial) on "public access channels" violated the First
Amendment. (Public access channels are chan-
cent material anytime after 10 p.m. Infinity Broad. Corp. of
Pa., 3 FCC Rec. 930 (1987) In its review of this decision, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the FCC's definition of indecency was not unconsti-
tutionally vague and overbroad, but, troubled with the relia-
bility of certain data relied upon by the Commission, vacated
several portions of the FCC's order. Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("ACT I").
Two months after the decision in ACT I, Congress instructed
the Commission to promulgate regulations enforcing the ob-
scenity and indecency provisions of § 1464 on a 24-hour per
day basis. Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2186, 2228
(1988). The Commission complied by issuing a regulation
banning all broadcasts of indecent material. The Court of
Appeals reviewed the 24-hour ban and struck it down. Ac-
tion for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) ("ACT II"). The Supreme Court declined review.
Congress then intervened again, passing the Public Telecom-
munications Act of 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949.
Section 16(a) of the Act provides that, with one exception,
indecent materials may only be broadcast between the hours
of midnight and 6 a.m. Id. at § 16(a). The exception permit-
ted public radio and television stations that go off the air at
or before midnight to broadcast such materials after 10 p.m.
nels that, over the years, local governments have
required cable system operators to set aside for
public, educational, or governmental purposes as
part of the consideration an operator gives in re-
turn for permission to install cables under city
streets and to use public rights-of-way.) In con-
trast, by a vote of 7-2, the Court upheld sections of
the Act allowing cable operators to refuse inde-
cent programming on "leased access channels,"
which are paid for by independent programmers.
(A leased channel is a channel that federal law re-
quires a cable system operator to reserve for com-
mercial lease by unaffiliated third parties. About
ten to fifteen percent of a cable system's channels
would typically fall into this category.) The Jus-
tices found that the term "indecent" was not un-
constitutionally vague and that the leased access
provisions were constitutionally appropriate
means of addressing the interest in protecting
children from indecent material and balancing
the relative interests of cable operators and pro-
grammers. Finally, by a vote of 6-3, the Court
held unconstitutional the provisions of the law
that require cable operators to place indecent ma-
terial on leased access channels on segregated
channels that are initially "blocked," requiring the
customer to have them un-blocked by filing a writ-
ten request.
Justice Breyer made a number of relatively
loose statements in Denver Area that are particu-
larly troubling with regard to the question of the
government's power to regulate electronic media
In the third round of appellate review, the Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, upheld the restrictions. Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
("Act III"). In Act III, the court found that the government
has a compelling interest in protecting children under the
age of 18 from exposure to indecent broadcasts. The court
was satisfied that, standing alone, the "channeling" of inde-
cent broadcasts to the hours between midnight and 6 a.m.
would not unduly burden the First Amendment. The court
also found, however, that the distinction drawn by Congress
between certain public broadcasters that go off the air early
and commercial broadcasters did not bear any apparent rela-
tionship to the compelling governmental interests that sec-
tion 16(a) was intended to serve, and thus held the more re-
strictive limitation unconstitutional. The court therefore
remanded the cases to the FCC with instructions to revise its
regulations to permit the broadcasting of indecent material
between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. The Supreme
Court denied review. This then serves as the model for the
proposal to limit beer advertising to the hours of 10 p.m. to 6
a.m.
9 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
10 Id.; Cable Television Consumer Protection and Com-
petition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1486.
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to protect children. Justice Breyer thus spoke ap-
provingly of Pacifica, and noted that protecting
children from exposure to patently offensive sex-
related material was an "extremely important"
and a "compelling" justification.I1
It is difficult to decipher what the Denver
Area case portends. Because it is a case dealing
with sexual material, it may well be possible to
cabin the decision within the narrow Pacifica line
of cases. The Denver Area decisions does seem to
signal, however, that there is a great deal of fluid-
ity on the current Supreme Court with regard to
issues concerning electronic media and children,
a fluidity than only encourages the culture of reg-
ulation.
POLITICAL REALITIES THAT DRIVE
THE CULTURE OF REGULATION
Sigmund Freud claimed that all behavior is
over-determined, and that presumably applies to
political behavior as much as any other. There
are probably many political factors that make the
climate today hospitable to the culture of regula-
tion. One political reality of the day, however,
strikes me as especially significant: the success of
the Bill Clinton centrist strategy to co-opt much of
the Republican Party's appeal to family values by
an agenda that emphasizes making the world of
electronic communication friendly to children.12
The Democrats played their family values hand
brilliantly, and their trump card was protecting
kids from bad speech - on television and on the
Internet, and in the form of sheltering them from
excesses of violence, sex, and bad habits such as
smoking and drinking.13 One interesting and
largely uncharted constitutional question is the
extent to which "deals" brokered by the White
II Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2386.
12 CORN-REVERE, supra note 1.
13 Some might argue that a second political reality of im-
portance is the changing face of the communications indus-
try. As the corporate ownership of the major broadcast and
cable companies has changed, some may believe, so has the
willingness to work with the government on social policies
such as protecting kids. Thus it is sometimes claimed that to
many of the new owners of major broadcast and cable media,
freedom of speech and editorial autonomy are not the values
they used to be. Good public relations and good governmen-
tal relations are becoming more important than stubborn in-
dependence. I do not know how to evaluate this argument; I
suspect that there is still a great deal of contrariness and First
Amendment spunk left in the communications industry, but
it is, as it probably always has been, blended with a healthy
House pressuring broadcasters to acquiesce in
some forms of regulation might themselves violate
the First Amendment. 14
A CASE STUDY IN THE CULTURE OF
REGULATION: CHILDREN'S TELEVISION
Rationales and Rationalizations does an excellent
job of mapping out the primary lines of attack on
the culture of regulation. I wish to take one spe-
cific recent example of the triumph of the culture
of regulation - the FCC's promulgation of stan-
dards for educational children's television - and
use it as a lesson in how the culture of regulation
works, and how it might be countered in ajudicial
attack.15
The FCC launched its new approach to improv-
ing the quality of children's educational program-
ming by issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemakinga6 in
which it proposed to take one of three courses of
action: (1) the monitoring of broadcasted pro-
gramming specifically designed to serve the edu-
cational needs of children to determine if there is
a significant increase in such programming; (2)
establishment of a safe harbor quantitative
processing guideline for children's educational
programming; or (3) promulgation of a program-
ming standard setting forth a specified average
number of hours for children's educational pro-
gramming. These alternatives were in turn
anchored by a proposed definition of "core" edu-
cational programming setting forth requirements
for the design, purpose, hours, scheduling regu-
larity, programming length and identifying infor-
mation that such programming must contain.
Broadcasters at first fought the proposed actions
vigorously, but in August 1996, pushed hard by
pressure from the White House, the broadcasters
dose of economic pragmatism.
14 In Writers Guild v. FCC, the court held unconstitutional
a plan that arose when the FCC pressured the National Asso-
ciation of Broadcasters into accepting a plan that would
place program material unsuitable for children after 9 p.m.
and be accompanied by warnings. Writers Guild v. FCC, 423
F. Supp 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
15 I opposed the FCC's new proposals for children's tele-
vision, and filed a statement on behalf of the National Associ-
ation of Broadcasters arguing against the Commission pro-
posals, echoing the views expressed in this commentary.
16 In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Televi-
sion Programming; Revision of Programming Policies for
Television Broadcast Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
10 FCC Rcd. 6308 (1995).
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and the Commission reached a deal agreeing to
acceptance of minimal children's programming
requirements.' 7
Now it is very difficult to argue without embar-
rassment against governmental regulations aimed
at enhancing children's programming. Nobody is
going to take the position that we need poorer
quality children's programming. If there is a case
to be made against what the FCC did with regard
to children's television, it must be not the goal
but the method that is attacked, the method of
using governmental power and leverage to exact
concessions from the private sector.
We should begin by laying out with greater
specificity the philosophical impulses that lead to
the Commission's original proposals. All are fa-
miliar themes in the culture of regulation. The
proposals were driven by the judgment that eco-
nomic market forces operate to deter broadcast-
ers from providing what the Commission believed
was sufficient educational programming for chil-
dren. Broadcasters thus had to be forced more
directly through regulation to provide additional
programming. "
I submit, however, that to the extent that the
Commission's proposals are motivated by the
judgment that "you can't ... get this kind of pro-
gramming unless you oblige it," they were predi-
cated on a governmental interest that, as a matter
of law, was not a permissible basis for FCC regula-
tion.
"At the heart of the First Amendment lies the
principle that each person should decide for him
or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of ex-
pression, consideration, and adherence."' 9 This
is not some featherweight precept floating on the
periphery of First Amendment doctrine, but a
core constitutional principle; government action
"that requires the utterance of a particular
message favored by the Government, contravenes
17 Paul Farhi, Broadcasters Pledge 3 Hours of "Educational"
TV a Week, WASH. PosT, July 30, 1996, at Al. Broadcasters
agreed to a compromise plan whereby stations must air three
hours per week of "educational" programming. Stations that
air less than three hours per week of regularly scheduled pro-
gramming may offer an equivalent amount by running spe-
cials and public-service announcements or by financing edu-
cation programs that air on other stations. Broadcasters that
fall below the standard would have to justify their program-
ming choices to the Commission.
18 This rationale was been forcefully advanced as the
predicate for the Commission's proposals by Chairman Reed
Hundt in numerous speeches and interviews. See Don Olden-
burg, Tuning in the Future of Kids' TV WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
this essential right."20 Indeed, in Turner Broadcast-
ing the Supreme Court sternly instructed that
such laws "pose the inherent risk that the Govern-
ment seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory
goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or informa-
tion or manipulate the public debate through coercion
rather than persuasion."21
Now it must be conceded that the Commis-
sion's proposals for enhancing children's televi-
sion were not an attempt at censorship in the
traditional sense. The Commission clearly was
not attempting to "suppress unpopular ideas or
information." However, the Commission was
quite unabashedly considering strategies that "ma-
nipulate the public debate through coercion
rather than persuasion." This is something the
Commission should not have been permitted to
do under the First Amendment
First Amendment principles do not permit the
FCC to exercise at-large authority to regulate the
programming of broadcasters for the purpose of
correcting perceived deficiencies in the program-
ming generated by broadcasters within the envi-
ronment of the competitive commercial market-
place. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the regime of Red Lion does not
grant the Commission carte blanche over the pro-
gramming choices of broadcasters. "Government
regulation over the content of broadcast program-
ming must be narrow, and that broadcast licen-
sees must retain abundant discretion over pro-
gramming choices." 22
Pointedly, the Supreme Court in Turner Broad-
casting specifically rejected the "market dysfunc-
tion" justification for the regulation of broadcast-
ers. In direct response to the Government's
argument in Turner that the foundations for the
Red Lion standard of review are not the physical
limitations of the electro-magnetic spectrum but
rather the alleged "market dysfunction" of the
1995, at B5 ("'You can't expect in the normal workings of the
marketplace to get this kind of programming unless you
oblige it,' says FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, who has champi-
oned the proposal for new rules that would require commer-
cial networks to schedule a minimum of high-quality and in-
novative children's educational shows and is actively seeking
the public's support for it.").
19 Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641
(1994).
20 Id.
21 Id. (emphasis added).
22 Id. at 651 (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of
Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378-80 (1984)); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 126 (1973).
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broadcast market, the Supreme Court sharply re-
plied that "the special physical characteristics of
broadcast transmissions, not the economic char-
acteristics of the broadcast market, are what un-
derlies our broadcast jurisprudence." 2 3
The current First Amendment standard gov-
erning broadcast regulation, as distilled in FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 24 is that a regulation will
be upheld only when "the restriction is narrowly
tailored to further a substantial governmental in-
terest, such as ensuring adequate and balanced
coverage of public issues."2 5 In applying this stan-
dard, a standard grounded exclusively in the spec-
trum scarcity rationale emanating from Red Lion,
the Supreme Court has never countenanced gov-
ernment regulations that impose specifically de-
fined affirmative programming requirements on
broadcasters. To the contrary, the First Amend-
ment "window" opened by Red Lion and its prog-
eny has been limited to regulations aimed nar-
rowly at ensuring equality of access in public
debate and the channeling of indecent program-
ming.26 No matter how vigorously the Commis-
sion may disclaim any intent to become a federal
"Office of the Censor," the inevitable regulatory
response of specific program requirements will be
program-by-program review of the content of
children's offerings aired by broadcasters, to de-
termine if those programs meet the definition im-
posed by the Commission. Specific programming
requirements are senseless without specific regu-
latory enforcement. Such program-by-program
review would mark a fundamental shift in the phi-
losophy governing broadcast regulation at odds
with statutory limitations, prior Court sanctioned
Commission practice, and core First Amendment
principles.
The spectrum scarcity rationale upon which
First Amendment doctrine governing the content-
based regulation of broadcasting is currently
grounded does not provide the Commission with
plenary power to impose its views of wise social
policy on the programming choices of broadcast-
ers. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has
drawn a sharp distinction between potential regu-
latory schemes. On the one hand are regulations
23 Turner, 512 U.S. at 640 (1994) (citing League of Wo-
men Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 377); FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978); Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
24 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
25 Id. at 380.
implemented to ensure reasonable balance and
access equity in the presentation of views on issues
of public concern or the political process. Regu-
lations that intrude on the independence and dis-
cretion of broadcasters, particularly in the selec-
tion of actual programming sources, are markedly
distinct. Thus the Court has observed that
"although the Government's interest in ensuring
balanced coverage of public issues is plainly both
important and substantial, we have, at the same
time, made clear that broadcasters are engaged in
a vital and independent form of communicative
activity."2 7
Because of spectrum scarcity, the Supreme
Court has instructed the Commission to require a
degree of balance and access in the presentation
of diverse views on public controversies and elec-
tions. However, spectrum scarcity does not justify
turning broadcasters into common carriers, or
subjecting broadcasters to specific governmental
mandates with regard to particular types of pro-
gramming. In those cases in which the Court has
permitted regulation under the balance and ac-
cess rationales, it has heavily emphasized the lim-
ited scope of such incursions. When the Court
sustained a right of access for federal candidates,
for example, it noted that this was a "limited right
to 'reasonable' access."2 8 The Court noted that
this right that did "not impair the discretion of
broadcasters to present their views on any issue or
to carry any particular type of programming,"2 9
The Court has referred to this tension between
the obligations of broadcasters and their indepen-
dence as members of a free press in our constitu-
tional system as a "tightrope" calling for "delicate
balancing":
This role of the Government as an "overseer"
and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public
interest and the role of the licensee as ajournalis-
tic "free agent" call for a delicate balancing of
competing interests. The maintenance of this bal-
ance for more than forty years has called on both
the regulators and the licensees to walk a "tight-
rope" to preserve the First Amendment values
written into the Radio Act and its successor, the
Communications Act.3 0
26 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 22.
27 League of Women Voters of CaL, 468 U.S. at 378.
28 CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981).
29 Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
30 CBS v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973).
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Following the general trend of the current cul-
ture of regulation, the FCC lost its constitutional
balance and fell off the tightrope with its chil-
dren's television rules.
If the FCC's approach to children's television
were challenged in court, the Commission would
be hard pressed to reconcile its rules with a
number of statements made by the Supreme
Court in Turner Broadcasting.
In the critical passage of the Turner Broadcasting
opinion, the Court began with the concession
"that broadcast programming, unlike cable pro-
gramming, is subject to certain limited content re-
straints imposed by statute and FCC regulation."
s1 In a footnote the Court then cited, as its first
illustration, the Children's Television Act, which
it characterized as "directing [the] FCC to con-
sider extent to which license renewal applicant
has 'served the educational and informational
needs of children.' "32 It is worth underscoring
that by this characterization, the Court clearly un-
derstood the Commission's statutory authority as
limited to consideration of the extent to which
licensees have satisfied this obligation as part of
the license renewal process. Far more impor-
tantly, the Court then went on to explain, in quite
sweeping terms, the jurisprudential principles
that constrain the Commission's power to regu-
late the content of broadcasting. In this decisive
segment of its opinion, the Court observed that
the argument against must-carry "exaggerates the
extent to which the FCC is permitted to intrude
into matters affecting the content of broadcast
programming."3 3 This exaggerated characteriza-
tion of the FCC's authority, the Court explained,
failed to take into account the doctrine that the
FCC may not prescribe any particular type of pro-
gramming that must be offered by broadcast sta-
tions. The Commission may in license renewal in-
quire as to what licensees have done to meet their
statutory obligations, but it may not through rule
impose programming requirements:
31 Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 649
(1996) (emphasis supplied).
32 Id. at 649 n.7.
3s Id. at 650.
34 Id., quoting Network Programming Inquiry, Report and
Statement of Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 7293 (1960).
35 Turner, 512 U.S. at 651 quoting En Banc Programming
Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2312 (1960).
36 Turner, 512 U.S. at 651(1994) ("The FCC is well aware
of the limited nature of its jurisdiction, having acknowledged
that it "has no authority and, in fact, is barred by the First
"In particular, the FCC's oversight responsibilities do
not grant it the power to ordain any particular type of
programming that must be offered by broadcast sta-
tions; for although 'the Commission may inquire of
licensees what they have done to determine the needs
of the community they propose to serve, the Commis-
sion may not impose upon them its private notions of
what the public ought to hear."' 3 4
Not content to let matters rest there, the Court
then made its point a second time, using as its ex-
ample the limitations on the Commission's au-
thority over noncommercial educational stations.
The Court's discussion on this issue is particularly
relevant to the current proceedings, for the Court
was parsing the statutory and constitutional con-
fines of the Commission's authority to define edu-
cational programming:
"What is important for present purposes, however, is
that noncommercial licensees are not required by stat-
ute or regulation to carry any specific quantity of "edu-
cational" programming or any particular "educational"
programs. Noncommercial licensees, like their com-
mercial counterparts, need only adhere to the general
requirement that their programming serve "the public
interest, convenience or necessity."35
In these passages, the Court was thus under-
scoring a long-standing limitation, a limitation that
Congress has understood and endorsed and,
more importantly, that Congress, the Commis-
sion, and the courts have all previously under-
stood as undergirded by limitations in the First
Amendment itself. Indeed, in describing these
limits on FCC authority, the Court in Turner
Broadcasting quoted liberally from the Commis-
sion's own prior acknowledgments that more in-
trusive regulation would violate First Amendment
principles.36
Chairman Hundt has suggested that specific
programming standards would actually enhance
First Amendment values, citing the general First
Amendment doctrine favoring precise over vague
standards. 3 This argument, however, is sleight
of hand, for it invokes the precision principle en-
tirely out of context, and in so doing turns ex-
isting First Amendment doctrine upside down.
Amendment and [§ 326] from interfering with the free exer-
cise of journalistic judgment." quoting Hubbard Broad., 48
F.C.C.2d 517, 520 (1974)). See also Turner, 512 U.S. at 651
("The FCC itself has recognized that 'a more rigorous stan-
dard for public stations would come unnecessarily close to
impinging on First Amendment rights and would run the col-
lateral risk of stifling the creativity and innovative potential of
these stations." quoting Public Broad., 98 F.C.C.2d 746, 751
(1982)).
37 Chairman Reed E. Hundt, A New Paradigm for Broadcast
Regulation, Address at the Conference for the Second Cen-
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When government is engaging in negative regula-
tion, proscribing certain speech and establishing
penalties for its utterance, doctrines such as "over-
breadth" and "vagueness" do work to require pre-
cision in drafting.38 Similarly, laws that presume
to restrict speech must be precisely tailored,
sweeping no more broadly than necessary to effec-
tuate the government's purposes. 3 But these
First Amendment axioms have never been applied
in the opposite direction: there is simply no such
thing as a requirement that government act pre-
cisely when ordering speakers what to say, because
the very notion of ordering speakers to speak to
suit the government's purposes is antithetical to
free speech. The premise of the Chairman's ar-
gument is thus profoundly flawed; the precision
principle, designed to protect speakers from gov-
ernment overreaching, cannot be invoked to aid
and abet it. The Supreme Court's many ringing
pronouncements that the government may not
impose obligations on speakers to speak certain
messages pleasing to the government are not
magically mooted merely because the government
is careful to be precise in its marching orders.
Indeed, when the government is enforcing af-
firmative obligations to speak, the greater the
specificity, the greater the offense. This indepen-
dence and autonomy of speakers under our con-
stitutional system to decide for themselves what to
say and what not to say is a universal theme in
First Amendment jurisprudence, cutting across
various forms of media and subject matter.4 0
Most recently, in Hurley v. Irish American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,4 1 the
Supreme Court, drawing heavily on Turner Broad-
tury of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law (Sept. 21,
1995) (transcript available on-line, (visited April 22, 1997)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/Spreh528.txt>)
[hereinafter New Paradigm Speech].
38 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)
(overbreadth); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)
(vagueness).
39 Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
126 (1989).
40 See e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Util. Comm'n of
Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (commercial speech case striking
down forced inclusion of messages of others, noting that "all
speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to
leave unsaid"); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comrt'n, 115 S.
Ct. 1511, 1516, 1519 (1995) (striking down ban on anony-
mous campaign literature, emphasizing First Amendment
right of speakers to make their own "decisions concerning
omissions or additions to the content of a publication," and
to choose for themselves what to "include or exclude"); Tur-
ner Broad., 512 U.S. 622, 650 (noting that "the FCC's over-
casting, spoke eloquently of the centrality of this
autonomy principle in our First Amendment tra-
dition:
"Our tradition of free speech commands that a speaker
who takes to the street corner to express his views in
this way should be free from interference by the State
based on the content of what he says .... The very idea
that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to
produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some
groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First
Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a pro-
posal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expres-
sion. The Speech Clause has no more certain antithe-
sis . .. . While the law is free to promote all sorts of
conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promot-
ing an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
one, however enlightened either purpose may strike
the government.4 2
In short, the spectrum scarcity rationale en-
dorsed in Red Lion grants the government limited
authority to impose on broadcast licensees a nar-
rowly circumscribed obligation to present contesting
viewpoints. But it does not authorize government
to impose on licensees any obligation to present
certain kinds of programming beyond these lim-
ited requirements of balanced public debate,
however enlightened the government's purposes
may be.4 3  The Commission's rules dictate to
broadcasters significant elements of the mix and
makeup of their programming schedules. This
use of the government's power "violates the fun-
damental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to
choose the content of his own message." 44
Finally, a point should be made about constitu-
tional alternatives to the Commission's proposals.
The worthy goal of encouraging high-quality chil-
sight responsibilities do not grant it the power to ordain any
particular type of programming"); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 717 (1977) ("However, where the State's interest is
to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to
some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First
Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such
message.").
41 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
42 Id. at 2350 (citations omitted). As eloquent as this
statement would have been in any Supreme Court opinion,
its force is accentuated for the purposes of these proceedings
by the fact that the Court in Hurley drew extensively from
Turner Broadcasting to support its holding. Hurley, 115 S. Ct.
at 2848-50.
43 See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110
(1973) ("Congress intended to permit private broadcasting
to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent
with its public obligations.").
44 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2347.
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dren's programming can be pursued most di-
rectly and effectively by the government if it sim-
ply funds such programming, through support of
PBS, the NEA or other entities that financially
contribute to the creation and production of chil-
dren's programming. On this score, I fully sup-
port the views of Professor Cass Sunstein, who
proposes such increased funding as a desirable re-
form. 45 Chairman Hundt has cited the views of
Professor Sunstein in support of the Commis-
sion's current proposals. 46 But with sincere re-
spect, where Chairman Hundt and Professor Sun-
stein go wrong is in taking the next step, which
assumes that the Commission may, vigorously en-
force the Children's Television Act in a manner
that imposes specific affirmative programming re-
quirements on broadcasters in a manner consis-
tent with the First Amendment. 47
The impulse for this second step is understand-
able - in today's political climate it may well be
that Congress is highly unlikely to increase the
funding for public broadcasting or the arts, and
therefore the temptation exists to attempt to ac-
complish through regulatory fiat what cannot be
obtained through congressional subsidy. The
First Amendment, however, stands squarely in the
way.
The Commission's proposals partake of a philo-
sophical view that permeates much of the writings
of Professor Sunstein and the speeches of Chair-
man Hundt: that the government may regulate
public discourse in order to elevate it. Under this
view, the government should play an affirmative
role in elevating public debate and discussion and
may use its regulatory powers to that purpose.
Moreover, this is not seen as creating tensions
45 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH 84 (1st ed., The Free Press) (1993).
46 New Paradigm Speech, supra note 37.
47 SUNSTEIN, supra note 45, at 84-85.
48 Among its most famous adherents is Judge Robert
Bork. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend-
ment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
49 See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)
("We do not [agree] that the constitutional protection for a
free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line
between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for
the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with
instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's
amusement, teaches another's doctrine."); Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) ("The importance of
motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to
inform."); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("guar-
antees for speech and press are not the preserve of political
with the First Amendment, because, under this
philosophy, the purpose of the First Amendment
is to enhance public deliberation and self-govern-
ance. This is a classic and oft-repeated theme in
scholarly discussion about the First Amend-
ment.48 But while this view states a respectable in-
tellectual position on what some believe the First
Amendment ought to be, it certainly does not accu-
rately describe the First Amendment as it is.
Listening to Chairman Hundt or Professor Sun-
stein, the broadcast world sounds as if it should all
look like NPR or PBS. But the First Amendment
does not play such favorites. The New York Post en-
joys the same constitutional protections as The
New York Times, Entertainment Tonight as the Mac-
Neil, Lehrer News Hour and Mighty Morphin Power
Rangers as Sesame Street. While political speech is
certainly at the "core" of the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the
First Amendment protects the emotional content
of speech as well as the cognitive, the entertaining
as well as the informing.4 9
The impulse to improve the quality of chil-
dren's educational and informational program-
ming is laudable.50 Drawing on this commenda-
ble impulse, Chairman Reed Hundt recently
advanced the view that the Commission's current
proposals regarding children's programming do
not run afoul of the First Amendment. The
Chairman's theme was that the law sometimes
does infringe on the natural freedom citizens en-
joy in the open marketplace, particularly in the
interest of protecting the interests of families and
children; thus zoning laws restrict land uses in res-
idential neighborhoods, and safety laws require
children to wear motorcycle helmets.5 1
expression or comment on public affairs, essential as those
are to healthy government."); United Mine Workers v. Illi-
nois Bar Assoc., 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) (the protections of
the First Amendment "are not confined to any field of
human interest."); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971) ("We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution,
while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech,
has little or no regard for that emotive function which, prac-
tically speaking, may often be the more important element of
the overall message sought to be communicated.").
50 There are extant today a growing number of eloquent
pleas for more creative educational programming. See
Newton N. Minow & Craig L. LaMay, ABANDONED IN THE
WASTELAND (1995).
51 See Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Long Live Frieda Hen-
nock, Address at the Women in Government Relations Con-
ference (August 24, 1995) (transcript available at FCC)
("Notwithstanding First Amendment challenges, courts have
repeatedly held that government can require certain
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The philosophical view advanced by the Chair-
man is appropriate for vast areas of American eco-
nomic and social life. Our Constitution and our
traditions of governance do not require blind
faith in the efficacy of the free market. Experi-
ence has taught us that laws often are necessary to
protect the quality of life in residential neighbor-
hoods or children from head injuries in motorcy-
cle accidents. Yet, the Chairman's philosophy has
been roundly rejected in matters dealing with
freedom of expression. When the First Amend-
ment is implicated, paternalism is the exception,
not the rule. The regulation of freedom of expres-
sion is not the same as the regulation of land use
or safety helmets. To repeat the Supreme Court's
recent admonition, " [w] hile the law is free to pro-
mote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful be-
havior, it is not free to interfere with speech for
no better reason than promoting an approved
message or discouraging a disfavored one, how-
ever enlightened either purpose may strike the
government."5 2 Although the First Amendment,
at present, may countenance such narrow regula-
tion of the content of broadcasting as the inde-
magazines on open newsstands to be in brown paper wrap-
pers. Government can zone certain kinds of stores away from
residential neighborhoods. Government can require kids on
motorcycles to wear safety helmets. The FCC can forbid ra-
dio and television shows from broadcasting indecent material
until after 10 p.m., when almost all kids are or should be in
bed. None of these actions are inconsistent with the First
Amendment and reasonable steps to use the airwaves in a
real, specific concrete way to provide public interest pro-
grams are also not barred by the First Amendment.").
52 Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group
of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2350 (1995).
53 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (striking
down "highly paternalistic" advertising restrictions); Riley v.
National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 790-91
(1988) ("[t]he State's remaining justification - the paternal-
istic premise that charities' speech must be regulated for
their own benefit - is equally unsound. The First Amend-
ment mandates that we presume that speakers, not the gov-
ernment, know best both what they want to say and how to
say it." (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479
U.S. 208, 224 (1987))). See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
cency proscriptions upheld in Pacifica, it has never,
even in the special sphere of broadcasting, been
understood to permit the government to com-
mandeer the speech rights of independent speak-
ers, forcing them to produce messages the gov-
ernment deems socially desirable. 5
The government is not powerless in this matter.
The Children's Television Act does impose obliga-
tions on broadcasters, and the Commission is di-
rected to treat those obligations seriously during
license renewal proceedings. The Commission
may use its persuasive powers, and the Chairman
the bully pulpit, to cajole broadcasters and en-
courage more innovative children's program-
ming. And ultimately, of course, if the govern-
ment perceives deficiencies in the offerings of the
marketplace, it may enter the market itself to sell
its own wares.5 4 The government may directly or
indirectly subsidize the creation and broadcast of
high-quality children's programming. But what
the First Amendment does not permit is for gov-
ernment to pursue its objectives through the sim-
ple expedient of fiat.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-792, and n.31 (1978) (criticizing
State's paternalistic interest in protecting the political pro-
cess by restricting speech by corporations); Linmark Assocs.
v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (criticizing, in the
commercial speech context, the State's paternalistic interest
in maintaining the quality of neighborhoods by restricting
speech to residents). See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The very purpose of
the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from
assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulat-
ing the press, speech, and religion."). See also West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be or-
thodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion.").
54 See Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1313 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Scalia, J.) ("Nor does any case suggest that 'uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open debate' consists of debate from
which the government is excluded, or an 'uninhibited mar-
ketplace of ideas' one in which the government's wares can-
not be advertised.").
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